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Abstract 
 
Despite recent growth in surveillance capabilities there has been little discussion regarding the ethics of surveillance. Much of the 
research that has been carried out has tended to lack a coherent structure or fails to address key concerns. I argue that the just war 
tradition should be used as an ethical framework which is applicable to surveillance, providing the questions which should be 
asked of any surveillance operation. In this manner, when considering whether to employ surveillance, one should take into 
account the reason for the surveillance, the authority of the surveillant, whether or not there has been a declaration of intent, 
whether surveillance is an act of last resort, what is the likelihood of success of the operation and whether surveillance is a 
proportionate response. Once underway, the methods of surveillance should be proportionate to the occasion and seek to target 
appropriate people while limiting surveillance of those deemed inappropriate. By drawing on the just war tradition, ethical 
questions regarding surveillance can draw on a long and considered discourse while gaining a framework which, I argue, raises all 
the key concerns and misses none. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There has been a marked increase in the use of surveillance in democratic countries such as the UK and 
USA in recent years. This is due in part to the development of technology enabling surveillance to be 
undertaken more easily, cheaply and widely than before, and in part to the greater threat to society 
perceived in the wake of 9/11 and 7/7. Despite this increase there have been few attempts to develop a 
systematic normative ethics of surveillance. This paper sets out to do that, drawing on the just war 
tradition as a model. Through employing this model I will provide a framework by which the application 
of surveillance may be assessed and, in such cases as is necessary, limited or refined. 
 
The papers that do tackle the need to establish an ethic of surveillance can suffer from a lack of structure 
or overall coherence. For example Gary Marx, in his Ethics for the New Surveillance, lists 29 principles 
for consideration (Marx 1998). Aside from the fact that this makes for an unwieldy checklist, Marx 
mentions the comment of a reviewer that these include a mix of first principles and empirical 
consequences, and that the paper lacks any formal normative argument offering justification for those 
principles. Marx responds that such an argument would be a Rosetta stone to philosophers working in this 
area.  
 
While Marx’s principles are helpful, I believe that they are captured in the principles laid out by the just 
war tradition, which also provides the normative structure that Marx’s approach lacks. Moreover, by 
appealing to the just war tradition, we are able to ground the ethics of surveillance in a rich philosophical 
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tradition. Many of the ethical questions that arise in this field have received centuries of attention insofar 
as they apply to war. If they can be successfully transferred to the arena of surveillance then we stand to 
benefit enormously from the insights of these considerations as well as their failings. 
 
My aim in this paper is twofold. First, to convince the reader that the just war tradition provides an 
adequate framework for the evaluation of surveillance from a normative ethical perspective, capturing all 
of the concerns raised by others in the field and missing none out.1 Second, I argue that the tradition 
provides a rich discourse from which one can draw in order to inform the debate surrounding ethical 
surveillance. There are many considerations such as discrimination and proportionality which are explored 
throughout the just war tradition both historically and in the contemporary context. By appealing to the 
writings in this tradition I am able to draw on this thinking to inform the debate without needing to 
reinvent the wheel. Hence the principle of proportionality as it pertains to surveillance, I argue, can benefit 
from a consideration of how the principle of proportionality pertains to warfare.  
 
The just war tradition does not claim to say everything that can be said about justification in war. Some 
questions are not philosophical but rather empirical and hence better treated by psychology or sociology. 
The tradition offers a framework for ethical discussion rather than the data which populate that discussion. 
It does not, for instance, tell us that landmines blow childrens’ legs off, but rather that something which 
harms children in warfare is wrong. Similarly if chemical weapons were discriminating they might still be 
argued to be morally unacceptable. The just war tradition will not always say outright why this is the case, 
but it will provide a framework (possibly under the principle of means mala in se) with which to discuss 
it. 
 
The same is true in employing the just war tradition as a framework in the analysis of the ethics of 
surveillance. What I propose as a framework will not provide a solution to the question as to which harms 
are occasioned by particular forms of surveillance. What it will do is enable an analysis of the ethics of 
using those forms given the harms which are identified and established by empirical research. Similarly if 
acts of surveillance are suspected to be ethically dubious it will provide a structure which can be employed 
to analyse whether and why those acts are unethical. 
 
The core position for which I shall argue is that the majority of the principles discussed are necessary for 
surveillance to be justified. The one principle which may not be necessary is that of authority, which is 
desirable but not necessary. Otherwise I hold that there must be a justified cause, supported by a correct 
intention, that the surveillance must be necessary and have a chance of success, and that it be both 
proportional and subject to formal declaration. In terms of the means employed, acts of surveillance 
should again be proportionate in the harm that they occasion and they should seek to discriminate as much 
as possible between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Each of these shall be discussed in greater detail 
below.  
 
Individually, the principles do not amount to sufficient justification for surveillance. Taken together, 
though, they do provide sufficient justification. That is, if an act of surveillance can be shown to meet the 
requirements of the nine principles listed above then that act will be justified. Indeed, this is a central 
feature of my argument: that taken together the nine principles of just surveillance provide the necessary 
and sufficient conditions to justify an act of surveillance. 
 
Marx is not the only person to comment in this field. David Lyon suggests a possible grounding for 
surveillance ethics in the notion of personhood, drawing from the work of Levinas and Bauman (Lyon 
2001). His use of personhood rather than privacy stems from sociological concerns regarding the manner 
                                                     
1 In stressing the normative I am seeking to distinguish this from the more discursive approach which is also used 
in analysing the ethics of surveillance (e.g. Stoddart 2011, 2012). 
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in which the term privacy is or has been used. In this regard Lyon’s work is similar to that of Graham 
Sewell and James Barker, who concern themselves primarily with privacy in the workplace (Sewell and 
Barker 2001). They employ Foucauldian terms of power/knowledge and ‘rules of right’, an establishment 
of rights that are granted in different contexts. In both of these cases the authors first seek to establish 
what is wrong with surveillance and then go on to suggest a basic ethical framework against which 
surveillance may be assessed.  
 
Anita Allen takes a different approach to the question without suggesting the need for a framework as 
such (Allen 2008). Establishing first that surveillance is not inherently unethical she looks at a series of 
scenarios, starting with the smallest scale (self-interest and parental monitoring) and ending at the largest 
(state security). Throughout she draws on real world scenarios to make her point and appeals to an 
intuitive response. While this grounds the argument in reality, it risks the reader withholding judgement 
due to paucity of information in the particular cases, or simply disagreeing. She also raises or alludes to a 
number of questions which she fails to develop, such as the ethical significance of who is carrying out the 
surveillance, why are they performing this action, and whether the surveillance is necessary. Furthermore, 
while Allen highlights the distinction between justifying the decision to employ surveillance and the 
method of surveillance used, she does not develop this. I will argue that this distinction is important. Allen 
also fails to address several further concerns, such as proportionality and surveillance of inappropriate 
people. 
 
In this last area Allen is not alone. Few of the commentators considered above take into account the 
ethical issue that arises when inappropriate people are made the objects of surveillance. Rather, and 
operating with the benefit of hindsight in legal cases, for Allen it seems as if guilt (and thereby 
appropriateness) is assumed. However, surveillance is often undertaken with the aim of establishing guilt. 
In these cases the decision to employ surveillance must be based on suspicion rather than firm evidence, 
and so we need to ascertain the warrant for that suspicion and the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate targets in these cases. 
 
There is also the question of different kinds of surveillance, which is often overlooked. There is clearly a 
difference between standing on tip-toe outside someone’s bedroom window and operating a multi-billion 
dollar signals intelligence organisation such as the National Security Agency. Furthermore, these different 
kinds of surveillance will yield different levels of information, from a single blurry photograph, 
inadmissible in court due to its lack of clarity, to full video and audio capture of a person’s life over a 
period of time.  
 
A further concern arises from the questions of what information is gathered, and to what extent that 
information is relevant to the justifying cause. In the case of surveillance, extraneous information will be 
gathered alongside that which is relevant to the case at hand. To what extent should this be a concern, and 
what lengths should be undertaken to minimise the collection of such extraneous information? 
Additionally, how should any information collected through surveillance be used, stored and protected? 
 
These questions regarding justification, proportionality and a perceived need for discrimination will turn 
out to be well answered by an application of the just war tradition. Before turning to this, though, it is 
worth pausing to summarise the principles of ethical assessment offered by those authors discussed above.  
 
Lyon lists three principles: participation, personhood and purpose (Lyon 2001). By participation I take 
him to mean those involved in the decision-making process: is it democratic and accountable. This 
touches on questions of the authority of the surveillant to carry out the surveillance. Personhood looks at 
how the surveillance affects the individual or group surveilled, a subject which Lyon has pioneered 
through recognition of the social sorting effect of surveillance (Lyon 2002). I see this as the harm visited 
by surveillance on those it affects, and the need for any such harm to be held in proportion to the justifying 
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cause. Finally, Lyon’s consideration of purpose analyses the justifying cause for the surveillance: why is 
surveillance being undertaken in the first place. 
 
Sewell and Barker similarly recognise authority and justifying cause as issues in surveillance, but do not 
look at proportionality as a separate principle (Sewell and Barker 2001). Rather they focus on necessity: is 
the act of surveillance really necessary or could a less intrusive measure be employed? This does touch on 
proportionality and harm, but contains significant differences. An act may be proportionate but not 
necessary, or it may be deemed necessary to achieve a desired end but not be proportionate to that end. 
 
The UK’s Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA 2000) recognises this distinction in that it 
employs the notions of proportionality (shared with Lyon) and of necessity (shared with Sewell and 
Barker) as separate issues (e.g. RIPA 2000: 29(2)). The Code of Practice regarding surveillance stemming 
from RIPA introduces a third consideration of discrimination: that surveillance should focus on the 
intended target as much as possible and seek to limit the monitoring of unintended targets (Home Office 
2010: 3.8-3.11). RIPA also recognises the need for the surveillance it oversees to be undertaken by a 
designated authority and for a specified cause (RIPA 2000: 29(4,5)).  
 
John Kleinig has produced what to me is the most comprehensive purely normative list to date (Kleinig 
2009). He lists cause, necessity and proportionality, separating the latter into the areas of proportionality 
of ends and proportionality of means. He also discusses the need for there to be a reasonable chance of 
success and a prohibition on means mala in se. That is, means which are evil in themselves and should 
thus never be used. In conventional warfare such means have been seen to include certain chemical and 
biological weapons, and increasingly anti-personnel landmines. In this Kleinig comes extremely close to 
my own position. Given that he was writing with practitioners in mind, and particularly the police, Kleinig 
takes authority as a given. However, his position fails to take into account discrimination which, as seen 
above, is included in the ethical principles of others as well as being one of the most established principles 
in the just war tradition. 
 
Finally, Gary Marx has, as noted, offered a list of 29 principles combining normative and empirical 
considerations (Marx 1998). I believe that these principles recognise the following concerns: authority, 
intention, cause, necessity, declaration of intent, reasonable chance of success, and proportionality of both 
ends and means. Significantly, though, Marx fails to deal with the issue of discrimination, which I hold to 
be a key concern.  
 
In summary, each of the above authors holds a part of the jigsaw, but none is able to complete the picture. 
A cursory glance at the list of principles discussed will show that some principles come up for several 
authors, while others appear only in the work of one (Table 1). There would not be this discrepancy had 
these authors appealed to the just war tradition. This contains all of the principles listed and misses none 
of them out. Furthermore, the just war tradition does not introduce any irrelevant considerations as regards 
surveillance, once the principles it offers have been applied correctly. Yet an appeal to the just war 
tradition goes further than this. The tradition has generated considerable philosophical discourse over the 
last 2,000 years (Reichberg et al. 2006). This rich seam of debate can be mined for considerable benefit in 
the discussion surrounding the ethics of surveillance.  
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Consideration Lyon 
Sewell 
& 
Barker 
RIPA Kleinig Marx Allen 
Just War 
Tradition 
Cause 
       
Authority 
   
 
   
Intention     
 
 
 
Necessity  
      
Chance of 
Success 
   
  
 
 
Declaration of 
Intent 
    
 
 
 
Proportionality 
 
 
   
 
 
Discrimination   
 
   
 
No means mala 
in se 
   
 
  
 
Treatment of 
prisoners 
       
  
Table 1: Summary of Principles of Ethical Surveillance in Academic Literature 
 
Objections 
 
Some might object to making comparisons between war and surveillance. In war people die or are 
maimed, not to mention raped, starved, displaced, etc. In the case of surveillance the associated harms, 
while they may be real enough, are not as severe. This is not the only disanalogy but it is a key 
consideration. To that end it is important to stress at the outset that I am not attempting to draw a parallel 
between war and surveillance. I accept that there are obvious disanalogies: to be subject to surveillance is 
unquestionably different from being subject to warfare.  
 
By contrast, what I am saying is that there is an analogy between the ethics of war and the ethics of 
surveillance. The analogy is not perfect. One cannot just take the principles as applied to warfare and, like 
a cookie-cutter, apply them to surveillance. However, it is possible to reshape those principles so that they 
provide an effective framework for analysis of acts of surveillance. Through considering the principles 
pertinent to the ethics of war it will be possible to develop a robust methodology for assessing the ethics of 
surveillance.  
 
A second possible disanalogy concerns consent. War is rarely the result of a free choice made by two 
parties. Surveillance, on the other hand, may be more likely to result from such a free choice. If a person 
consents to surveillance, or even requests it (imagine here contestants in the televised game show Big 
Brother), then is there harm in that surveillance? Questions of consent, including consent to be harmed, 
and the possibilities of exploitation and coercion are considerably larger than the scope of this paper. As a 
result I will focus here on non-consensual surveillance, which I take always to be pro tanto harmful. The 
questions raised in this paper will seek to ascertain whether and when these pro tanto harms can be 
outweighed. 
 
Hence there are disanalogies between surveillance and war. As noted, though, I am not arguing for an 
analogy between war and surveillance but between the ethics of war and the ethics of surveillance. Given 
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these disanalogies, though, why is it that the principles of the ethics of war transfer so neatly to the ethics 
of surveillance? It may be that the principles of the just war tradition are effective at limiting all kinds of 
harm. Normally we would seek to avoid harm, but most accept that there may be times in which causing 
harm could be justified. In these cases assessment needs to rest on the questions of who, what, why, where 
and when (Toner 2010) but beyond these, the just war tradition provides direction in seeking the 
normative answers to these questions—who should be carrying out surveillance, why should it be carried 
out, how and where should it be employed and so on. In particular it recognises and encourages limits on 
harmful actions such as necessity, proportionality and limitation of negative effects on bystanders. 
However, the core argument presented here is the picture itself, which is both plausible and more 
complete than the alternatives in that it captures all the salient concerns and does not miss key issues such 
as discrimination. 
 
Having established that it is at least prima facie plausible that the just war tradition be employed as a tool 
for understanding the ethics of surveillance, I turn first to the question of jus ad bellum, the justification of 
going to war, or in this case jus ad speculandum, the justification of employing surveillance. 
 
Just War and Surveillance 
 
Jus ad Speculandum—Justifying the decision to carry out surveillance 
The just war tradition traditionally includes seven principles under jus ad bellum: just cause, correct 
intention, proper authority, last resort, formal declaration, chance of success and proportionality. If we 
take these in turn and apply them to the issue of surveillance, the first issue that arises is one of just cause: 
the reason for the declaration of war and the importance that this be justifiable, usually in terms of defence 
(either of land or of people and their rights). As with war, and although it might seem obvious to state it, 
surveillance similarly should not be undertaken for salacious, trivial or ignoble causes (such as protection 
of pride or of individuals in government, etc.).  
 
Allen discusses just cause in referring to the case of Glenn Michael, who monitored the behaviour of his 
ex-wife and her suspected lesbian lover in order to gain evidence of her homosexuality which he believed 
would compromise her custody of their child (Allen 2008). When brought before a court, the judge agreed 
with Michael‘s claim that the child's interests would be better served through being raised by a single 
heterosexual man rather than two homosexual women. Whatever one thinks of the judge’s decision, let us 
assume that Michael’s purpose for carrying out surveillance on his ex-wife was in order to challenge the 
custody of the child rather than for his own titillation. If the latter then he should have been prosecuted as 
a peeping Tom. It is presumably because the judge believed that Michael had legitimate cause (whatever 
we may feel regarding that cause) to be carrying out the surveillance that he was not so prosecuted.  
 
So what would count as a just cause for surveillance? Considering the duty of the state to protect its 
citizens then such activity for the genuine defence of the lives of those citizens would seem to meet this 
condition. However, states have also found uses for surveillance other than public security, such as 
identifying political dissidents, which many would not consider justifiable.  
 
At the level of the family, Allen suggests that parental surveillance of children is justified. She quotes the 
examples of the parents of the killers at Columbine High School knowing nothing about their children’s 
maintaining arms caches in their homes, and of monitoring the behaviour of children who may become 
seriously overweight. Yet in these cases Allen overlooks the questions of appropriate targeting and 
warranted suspicion. She thus appears to suggest that all parents should be monitoring their children 
ceaselessly lest they too become serial killers at school, which seems to be extreme. This raises questions 
of necessity which shall be considered in due course, but for the purposes of adherence to the principle of 
just cause, the question is: are there reasonable grounds for suspicion? If yes, then it would appear as if a 
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parent would have just cause to closely monitor their child’s behaviour. Further to the need for grounds 
for suspicion is a sense of proportionality to the suspected problem, which I shall also consider shortly. 
 
Between the macro end of the scale, e.g. the state acting to protect the lives of its citizens, and the micro 
end, e.g. parents acting to protect their children from going astray, lie a series of different scenarios 
requiring clarification. Allen looks at the case of Hewlett Packard monitoring the phone conversations of 
its employees in order to discover a leak. Is corporate surveillance of employees in the event of a leak a 
justifying cause? Certainly it is in the interests of the company to maintain confidentiality and prevent 
leaks. Providing that those leaks are of purely commercial interests (that is, they are not the work of a 
whistle-blower regarding malpractice) then it would seem as if the company does have some justification, 
insofar as just cause is concerned, in acting to protect that confidentiality through monitoring its 
employees. However, to what extent the company is justified in carrying out surveillance is a thornier 
issue. This is especially so when one considers the harms involved in monitoring the conversations of a 
large number of innocent people, including personal calls to physicians, banks, spouses, etc. in order to 
apprehend the one guilty employee. 
 
Here a further value of the just war tradition as model in its application to the ethics of surveillance 
becomes apparent: just because an act may be justified in one respect (in this case, justifying cause), that 
does not render the act as justified in toto. The further considerations of necessity, proportionality, 
likelihood of success, etc. must also be taken into account. While Hewlett Packard may have had a 
justified cause to conduct surveillance in order to discover a commercial leak, if it had placed its entire 
workforce under surveillance then this may have been a disproportionate response and so the overall act of 
surveillance may still not be justified. 
 
The second principle in the just war tradition is correct intention. The intention behind declaring war 
should be the same as the cause given for going to war, hence preventing ulterior motives from becoming 
the motivating factor for that war. Intuitively it seems right that intention should be a consideration in 
assessing surveillance. Firstly if a just cause is to be insisted upon then for the surveillant to pursue an 
ulterior motive undermines the value of the just cause, which is arguably provided as a smokescreen for 
the ‘real’ motive. Secondly there is a strong reaction in most people to the difference between, say, a 
CCTV operator who watches people in the public square to identify known or potential terrorists, and one 
who watches the same people to identify attractive members of the opposite sex for his own titillation. 
 
The third principle of the just war tradition involves the issue of who is doing the surveillance, and on 
behalf of whom are they doing it. The just war tradition has tended to hold that the only authority ethically 
justified in declaring war is the sovereign. Similarly, in the context of genuine national security, the state 
might be seen to be the proper authority to carry out surveillance on behalf of its citizens. Whether or not 
the sovereign itself is a legitimate entity, though, is another question. Certainly, if a sovereign loses the 
moral authority to govern then any potential legitimacy as surveillant qua sovereign may also be lost. 
However I am not attempting here to extend the analogy to endorse the same answer as provided by just 
war tradition, still less attempting to suggest that the state is the only body justified in carrying out 
surveillance. My point is rather that the question of the moral legitimacy of the surveillant is an issue of 
major importance that needs to be addressed when considering the ethics of surveillance. 
 
There are numerous bodies which might claim, or seek to claim, the moral right to conduct surveillance. 
These include the state, but also the press, corporations, private investigators and individuals. As noted 
above, one might be hesitant to grant legitimacy of authority to the state purely on the grounds of its being 
the state, for this overlooks questions of the state’s own legitimacy as sovereign. In cases where the 
governing party has assumed totalitarian control it may see surveillance as a tool for its own survival and 
so use it against its citizens to discover political dissidents. This might contravene just cause (there is no 
threat to the state per se), but the scenario is such that the authority of the state should also be brought into 
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question. That said, if anyone is to have the moral authority to countenance surveillance, the claims of the 
state are, under usual circumstances, considerable: the duty of the state to protect its citizens is enshrined 
in most constitutions, and surveillance may be an effective way to contribute to public security. 
Furthermore, the mere fear of corruption or totalitarianism should not be allowed to override the need to 
protect the public. Hence the question of the moral legitimacy of the state to conduct surveillance should 
be related to the question of the moral legitimacy of the state itself, coupled with the likelihood and extent 
of possible corruption within a morally legitimate state.  
 
Beyond the state, the legitimacy of non-state actors should also be questioned. If and when the state is a 
morally legitimate authority in this area, can that legitimacy be conferred onto others such as private 
surveillance companies carrying out the state’s mandate? Are there other entities such as the free press 
which can claim moral legitimacy independent of the state? In the latter instance, the moral legitimacy of 
the press might be seen to increase as that of the state decreases in order to provide accountability. Once 
again, though, the other principles of the tradition should be brought to bear: what is the purpose of the 
surveillance, is it proportionate, etc.? It would be too easy to confer automatic legitimacy insofar as 
authority is concerned to the press and in the process place the paparazzi on a moral plane with 
investigative political journalism.  
 
At the individual level there is again the example of Glenn Michael. While this is a controversial case it 
should be borne in mind that, whatever one’s response to the motivation and judgement, in this instance 
our concern is in relation to the question of legitimate authority. Michael was carrying out the surveillance 
on behalf of himself (or, arguably, the child). Was he a legitimate authority? Merely being an interested 
party should not automatically give one the authority to carry out surveillance. Aside from questions of 
competence, it would be extreme to allow everyone to claim the authority to spy on anyone else in whom 
they had an interest. Regardless of specific concerns in the Michael case, then, the legitimacy of the 
surveillant needs to be addressed. 
 
Alternatively, Michael might have gone to a private investigator. If such businesses are legitimate within 
(and regulated by) a morally legitimate state then it is conceivable that the authority of the state to carry 
out surveillance may be transferred in particular instances to such entities. Hence non-state actors might 
be legitimate surveillants if legitimacy is conferred by a recognised authority. 
 
An obvious concern with surveillants is whether they are ethically trustworthy in how they gather, store 
and use their information (both relevant and extraneous). Such concerns can be tempered by state 
regulation, but in the absence of any regulation then the authority of the surveillant must be called into 
question, whether legitimated by the state or not.  
 
A fourth principle of jus ad bellum is last resort, or necessity: that the decision to go to war must come 
after all other options have been exhausted. Precisely what is meant by last resort in this case is debatable: 
at which point has a state reached ‘the final straw’ (see, for example, Walzer 2004: 53–54, 88; Lango 
2006)? Is it when the Nazis remilitarise the Rhineland, when they annex Austria, when they invade 
Czechoslovakia, when they invade Poland, when they invade the UK, or when their allies invade the US? 
Furthermore, if the demarche of an ambassador is all that precedes a war then the war might be felt to be 
hasty, but if one has to wait until enemy boots are on home soil then this might be leaving it somewhat 
late. Yet the more one escalates diplomatic and economic sanctions, the more the ‘enemy’ is going to 
suspect that military sanctions will at some stage follow, and so prepare for defence. Such preparations 
could lead to a more drawn out and bloody conflict than might otherwise have been the case. 
 
If the question of last resort is debated in relation to going to war, it is similarly unclear in the case of 
surveillance. Allen takes it as a given that surveillance should have been a last resort in the cases of 
Michael and Hewlett Packard, and takes it for granted that on neither occasion was this the case. In both 
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instances there were alternatives that should have been attempted. Not knowing the full details of each 
situation makes it hard to comment directly on Allen’s claim, but in the case of covert surveillance with 
the aim of gathering information the nature of the operation as essentially secretive must surely be 
relevant. If the surveillance weren’t secretive then it would risk altering the behaviour of the surveilled. 
This is, after all, the motivation behind deterrence. Had Michael asked his ex-wife whether she had taken 
a lesbian lover, and suggested the sanction that if she had he would challenge her custody of their child, 
then she might have been more careful about closing the curtains at night and so prevented him gaining 
the necessary evidence for his case. Similar things may be said about the Hewlett Packard case. 
 
Hence if surveillance were truly a final resort it would in many cases be rendered ineffective through 
losing the aspect of secrecy. In these circumstances it is unlikely to be justifiable as a matter of first resort 
as there will probably be less harmful methods which could be attempted (Lango 2006). When these have 
been tried and failed, and they will be different in different scenarios, then the surveillance meets this 
condition. However, we should also acknowledge that there are some methods which, although less 
intrusive, could compromise the later option of covert surveillance.  
 
The question of prejudicing results arises again with the fifth principle regarding a formal declaration of 
war, which I take in this instance to be a declaration of intent to carry out surveillance. Clearly a formal 
declaration to carry out surveillance may be inappropriate in the case of covert surveillance, lest it alter the 
behaviour of the surveilled and serve to counter any benefits which might otherwise result from the 
surveillance. By contrast, in cases of surveillance for deterrence, this would be a good thing, such as 
indicating the positioning of speed cameras and painting them yellow so that people are aware of them at 
accident hot spots. The significance of formal declaration might therefore be a problem for justifying 
particular covert surveillance operations, although possibly less so for the existence of the organisations 
which conduct those operations. The existence of such organisations can provide a deterrent without 
giving details of their methods and so compromising actual operations.  
 
The sixth principle is that the war must have a reasonable chance of success, which draws again on the 
purpose of the surveillance. If surveillance for information is unlikely to return the desired information 
then that operation is unlikely to be justified. Any information gained will be extraneous, potentially 
salacious, and bring into question the just cause of the operation. Similarly, if surveillance is justified by 
reference to deterring crime, and yet actually fails to deter crime, as figures suggest is the case in the UK 
(Hope 2009, 2010), then the justification for its application must once more be brought into question.  
 
The seventh and final principle of jus ad speculandum has been referred to several times, namely that the 
projected damage must be proportionate to the occasioning cause. That is, the foreseeable damage that 
surveillance could incur must be in proportion to the reason by which the surveillance is justified. 
However, what is meant by proportionality is not always clear. Intuitively many recognise acts as being 
disproportionate, but determining which considerations should be weighed in the balance in arriving at a 
conclusion regarding the proportionality of an act is not straightforward.  
 
Jus in Speculando—Justifying the means of surveillance 
The above principles characterise the traditional approach to jus ad bellum. If we turn now to jus in bello 
there are between two and four principles. Most authors agree that proportionality and the principle of 
discrimination are essential features of jus in bello. However, a case is sometimes made for including the 
further principles of no means mala in se and the benevolent treatment of prisoners (Orend 2005). Owing 
to this distinction, I shall concentrate in this paper on the principles of proportionality and discrimination. 
However, it is at least interesting to reflect on possible comparisons between the two further 
considerations and the ethics of surveillance. Are there, for example as Kleinig suggests, acts of 
surveillance which would class as being mala in se, which should never be used (Kleinig 2009)? Without 
delving too far into science fiction, could mind reading be considered in this category? As to the treatment 
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of prisoners, it could be asked whether those deserving to be subject to surveillance thereby lose all rights 
to privacy and similar considerations.  
 
The principle of proportionality, as with its counterpart in jus ad bellum, seeks for a response that is 
proportionate to the occasion. For jus in bello application this is less a question of the act of war as 
proportionate, as of individual actions. Hence the use of tactical nuclear weapons would most likely be 
judged disproportionate in response to an opponent armed only with rifles, but not an enemy similarly 
equipped. Applied to surveillance this principle makes reference to different kinds of surveillance and the 
idea that the less extreme the occasion, the less invasive and pervasive the surveillance should be. CCTV 
cameras in areas where cars are frequently stolen is more proportionate than bugging the telephones of 
everyone in the city in which the cars are being stolen. Hacking into an e-mail account to catch an 
employee suspected of stealing paper clips seems less justified than doing the same to catch a foreign spy. 
The principle is thus helpful in assessing which means of surveillance may be employed in situ, and so 
forms a crucial aspect of the ethical framework that must be considered in deploying surveillance. Films 
such as Enemy of the State (Scott 1998) play off this concern when the protagonist finds the full might of 
US state surveillance turned on just one person, the disproportionality of the situation (the use of 
technology designed to monitor the activities of enemy states being used on a single, and in the event, 
innocent person) feeding the audience’s support for the hero.  
 
The second in speculando principle is that of discrimination: the idea that, in the just war tradition, non-
combatants are immune from attack. Clearly there are no strict combatants (in the sense of uniformed 
individuals carrying weapons) in most cases of surveillance, unless one is talking about surveillance of 
enemy troops during times of war, but this principle is nonetheless significant, albeit with some 
modification. Michael Walzer argues that in everyday life we have a right to life which includes the right 
not to be attacked (Walzer 2006: 144–45). In the act of donning a uniform and picking up a gun one 
forfeits that right at the same time as gaining others, such as the manner of treatment if captured. Hence 
there is an important distinction between those actively involved in the prosecution of the war 
(combatants) and those not actively involved (non-combatants). As such, one is justified in targeting 
combatants, who have forfeited their right to immunity, but not non-combatants who retain that right.  
 
If this principle is taken to concern not combatants and non-combatants but legitimate and illegitimate 
targets, the principle’s applicability to surveillance becomes clearer. In the context of security and 
responding to crime appropriate targets would be those guilty of threatening security or of criminal acts, 
and inappropriate targets those who are innocent of such acts. A first thought here might be that 
surveillance should be targeted towards the guilty and away from the innocent as much as possible. 
However, there is an obvious difficulty. Surveillance is often carried out in order to determine innocence 
or guilt, and so the status of the surveilled prior to the act of surveillance is frequently unknown. This is a 
major oversight of Allen, who appears to hold that criminals waive some if not all of their privacy rights 
by virtue of having committed a crime (Allen 2008). Yet someone who is wrongly suspected of 
committing a crime has not waived any rights and so should not be considered a legitimate target for 
surveillance. This introduces the dilemma that the legitimacy of an act of surveillance may only be found 
subsequent to, and dependent on, that surveillance. Prior to the surveillance operation, as far as the 
surveillant is concerned, the person to be surveilled may or may not be a legitimate target. If they are 
legitimate then the surveillance is justified, but if they are illegitimate then it is not. As their legitimacy as 
a target is unknown, the matter of justification appears to be broadly a matter of luck. 
 
In suggesting the possibility of luck, though, one must be careful not to overlook the issue of pre-existent 
evidence. It has already been established that the decision to carry out the surveillance should not be 
capricious but resultant on weighing up the likelihood of its success. The justification might come down to 
the evidence available to the surveillant prior to the decision being made to initiate the operation. The 
justification for the decision whether to carry out surveillance would then be based on the evidence 
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available rather than the outcome of the surveillance (Lawlor 2006). As such, if the surveilled subject 
turns out not to have been guilty, but the evidence that they were guilty prior to the surveillance was 
strong, then there would have been no miscarriage of justice. On the other hand, if there were no evidence 
for a person’s guilt but surveillance was undertaken anyway then this would appear to be a clear breach of 
the principle of discrimination, regardless of the result.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The just war tradition can provide a powerful framework to help in establishing the rights and wrongs of 
surveillance. In most cases there is a clear analogy between the justification of war and the justification of 
surveillance, which enables the confident use of the just war tradition as a theoretical framework by which 
to assess the ethics of surveillance. The decision to carry out the surveillance is clearly distinct from the 
methods employed, and each has its own ethical criteria. In deciding whether or not surveillance is 
justifiable we need to consider who is conducting the operation, what justifications have they given for 
doing it and whether they have any ulterior motives; whether other, less harmful measures are a plausible 
alternative; if the surveillance has been declared; whether the operation is likely to be successful; and 
whether surveillance is proportionate to the occasioning cause. Beyond these are the further issues in the 
methodology of the surveillance: are the methods employed proportionate to the goal desired, and has the 
surveillant acted to limit the surveillance of illegitimate targets. 
 
These nine principles form an ethical framework for surveillance, grounded in a rich philosophical 
tradition. As we have seen, they encompass the desired ethical principles of Lyon, Sewell and Barker, 
Allen, and Marx but do so in a more coherent and/or comprehensive manner than any of these authors has 
so far suggested. It also ensures that ethical concerns are not overlooked. This was noted in the way in 
which Allen does not consider the possibility that a person under surveillance may be innocent and hence 
not have waived any privacy rights. Similarly, Lyon, Sewell and Barker only suggest tentative principles, 
none of which consider intention, declaration, chance of success or discrimination. Neither do they take 
into account the justification of methodology (jus in speculando) as distinct from the decision to employ 
surveillance (jus ad speculandum). Marx is different here as his 29 principles are thorough, although they 
too do not refer to the principle of discrimination. However this list lacks a coherence which can be 
achieved through appeal to the just war tradition, at the same time tapping into the heritage in moral 
discourse offered by that tradition. This discourse holds a huge literature of value to this debate, much of 
which will prove to be directly applicable. 
 
Hence the just war tradition can indeed be used to assess justifications for surveillance operations. 
Furthermore it should be used in that it adequately captures the concerns of others writing in this field and 
helps us to take into consideration legitimate concerns which are often missed by others. 
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